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Abstract One of the central aims of science is explanation: scientists seek to un-
cover why things happen the way they do.  This chapter addresses what kinds of 
explanations are formulated in biology, how explanatory aims influence other fea-
tures of the field of biology, and the implications of all of this for biology educa-
tion.  Philosophical treatments of scientific explanation have been both complicat-
ed and enriched by attention to explanatory strategies in biology.  Most basically, 
whereas traditional philosophy of science based explanation on derivation from 
scientific laws, there are many biological explanations in which laws play little or 
no role.  Instead, the field of biology is a natural place to turn for support for the 
idea that causal information is explanatory.  Biology has also been used to moti-
vate mechanistic accounts of explanation, as well as criticisms of that approach. 
 Ultimately, the most pressing issue about explanation in biology may be how to 
account for the wide range of explanatory styles encountered in the field.  This is-
sue is crucial, for the aims of biological explanation influence a variety of other 
features of the field of biology.  Explanatory aims account for the continued ne-
glect of some central causal factors, a neglect that would otherwise be mysteri-
ous.  This is linked to the persistent use of models like evolutionary game theory 
and population genetic models, models that are simplified to the point of unreality. 
 These explanatory aims also offer a way to interpret many biologists’ total com-
mitment to one or another methodological approach, and the intense disagree-
ments that result.  In my view, such debates are better understood as arising not 
from different theoretical commitments, but commitments to different explanatory 
projects.  Biology education would thus be enriched by attending to approaches to 
biological explanation, as well as the unexpected ways that these explanatory aims 
influence other features of biology.  I suggest five lessons for teaching about ex-
planation in biology that follow from the considerations of this chapter.  
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1 Introduction 
One of the central aims of science is explanation: scientists seek to uncover why 
things happen the way they do.  In biology, explanations have been sought for 
why offspring generally have the same traits as their parents; for why one area has 
a greater variety of species than another; for why the patterns on land snails’ shells 
show the type of variation they do; for why shark populations increased in the 
Adriatic Sea during World War I.  Biologists have also sought to understand the 
process by which plant cells convert sunlight into nutrients; the particular genetic 
influences on human smoking behavior; and why male seahorses, not females, 
gestate seahorse embryos.  All of these—and many, many more besides—are at-
tempts to explain biological phenomena, phenomena ranging from generalized to 
highly specific and from subcellular to encompassing vast swaths of the Earth.   
Accordingly, a primary project in philosophy of science is providing an ac-
count of the nature of explanation, of what it takes to explain something.  For over 
a hundred years, philosophers of science have been generating competing ac-
counts of explanation.  These accounts provide criteria that are supposed to be es-
sential to explanation, such that any successful explanation will meet those crite-
ria.  Accounts are motivated with reference to examples of successful scientific 
explanations.  In the early to mid twentieth century, much of philosophy of sci-
ence largely focused on physics.  Since then, philosophical treatments of explana-
tion have been both complicated and enriched by attention to explanatory strate-
gies in biology.   
In this chapter, I survey biology’s influence on philosophical accounts of scien-
tific explanation.  This highlights important features of explanatory practice in bi-
ology (Section 2).  I then discuss how the explanatory strategies utilized in biology 
are integral to making sense of other features of scientific practice, such as the 
continued neglect of some central causal factors (Section 3).  Finally, I make ex-
plicit how these issues bear on biology education (Section 4).   
2 Biology and Philosophical Accounts of Explanation 
A traditional and historically influential view in philosophy of science is that sci-
entific explanations are produced by deriving the phenomenon to be explained 
from laws of nature.  This deductive-nomological (D-N) account suggests that ex-
planations follow a simple pattern: a phenomenon is explained by a set of true sen-
tences from which the phenomenon’s description can be derived, and which con-
tains at least one law of nature essential to the derivation (Hempel and 
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Oppenheim, 1948; Hempel, 1965).1  For example, Mendel’s law of independent 
assortment and the fact that two genes are located on different chromosomes ex-
plains why the different alleles for those two genes are paired with each other in 
approximately the same number of gametes: according to Mendel’s law, each pair-
ing is equally likely. 
One feature of the D-N account of explanation that this example violates is that 
this strategy can only explain phenomena when scientific laws guarantee their oc-
currence.  The phenomenon must follow deductively, as a matter of logic, from 
the law and conditions cited.  A companion to the D-N account of explanation was 
thus developed to apply to statistical cases.  This inductive-statistical (I-S) account 
holds that phenomena can also be explained using an applicable statistical law, so 
long as the law confers high probability on the phenomenon. Technically, my 
simple example of explaining using the law of independent assortment is an I-S 
explanation.  Broadly, the idea behind the D-N and I-S approaches to explanation 
is that a phenomenon is explained by specifying how what we know about the 
world—our scientific laws—bears on the particular circumstances at hand, which 
renders the phenomenon expectable.  Laws of nature and the circumstances guar-
antee or render highly probable the phenomenon to be explained. 
The D-N and I-S approaches to explanation have largely fallen out of favor 
among philosophers in recent decades.  One prominent criticism is that there 
seems to be an asymmetry in the explanatory value of derivations that satisfy the 
D-N conditions of explanation.  Salmon (1989) employs the following example as 
an illustration.  By deriving the length of a shadow from the height of a flagpole 
and the position of the sun, one explains the length of the shadow.   But one can 
equally well derive the height of the flagpole from the length of the shadow and 
sun’s position, and it seems this does nothing to explain the height of the flagpole.  
This and other criticisms are taken to show that derivation is not in itself sufficient 
for explanation.   
Beyond the general difficulties with the D-N and I-S accounts, it seems that 
many biological explanations do not conform to this view of explanation.  For one 
thing, some phenomena that are acknowledged to be improbable are nonetheless 
thought to be explained.  For example, some genetic mutations are explained by 
oxidative damage, even though such mutations are rare and oxidants are frequent-
ly present.  Additionally, there are many biological explanations in which laws, 
whether deterministic or statistical, seem to play little or no role (Hull, 1992).  
Why does sickle-cell disease result in anemia? The explanation will undoubtedly 
cite features of the abnormally rigid, sickled red blood cells found in those with 
sickle-cell disease.  It would be at best strained to construe any element of the re-
sulting explanation as a scientific law.  Finally, there is plenty of uncertainty re-
garding even what should qualify as a biological law, and thus whether biology 
                                                            
1 For the sake of simplicity, I use the word “phenomenon” throughout this chapter to stand in for 
various conceptions of the target of explanation: events or laws, propositions, explananda, etc.  
Such distinctions are not central to the aim of this chapter. 
4  
has many, or any, laws to offer (Ruse, 1970; Brandon, 1997; see Lange this vol-
ume).  Whether Mendel’s “law” of independent assortment, used in the example 
of D-N explanation above, would qualify as a scientific law is itself dubious (see 
Jamieson and Radick this volume; see Burian this volume).   
Setting aside the difficulties with the requirement that any explanation cite a 
scientific law, as well as the requirement that any explanation confer a high prob-
ability on the explained phenomenon, the D-N and I-S approaches do align with 
some intuitions about what explanations should accomplish. This point was made 
by Friedman (1974) and Kitcher (1981; 1989).  Friedman and Kitcher both argue 
that an explanation of a phenomenon “unifies” that phenomenon with other scien-
tific beliefs in virtue of providing a pattern of argument from which all can be de-
rived.  According to this unification account, an explanation’s value stems from its 
generality, simplicity, and cohesion, as these features together generate the power 
to unify disparate phenomena.  Explanations that cite Mendel’s law of independ-
ent assortment fare better on this account than the D-N account.  Positing the in-
dependent assortment of genes (on different chromosomes) is a simple, cohesive 
explanation that is general enough to explain a variety of phenomena, ranging 
from a pea plant inheriting a parent’s wrinkled peas but not the yellowness of its 
peas, to there being a 50% chance that a woman who carries the x-linked recessive 
gene for Duchenne muscular dystrophy has a son with the disease, regardless of 
what other traits he does or does not inherit (not on the X chromosome).   
In contrast to the troubles encountered by the D-N and I-S accounts, explanato-
ry practice in biology offers support for a different philosophical view of explana-
tion, namely the causal account.  On this view, a phenomenon is explained by the 
causal factors that brought it about (Scriven, 1962; Salmon, 1989, 1998; Wood-
ward, 2003).  This is a natural interpretation of, for example, evolutionary expla-
nations that feature natural selection.  The redshank sandpiper (Tringatotanus), a 
bird that feeds on worms in mudflats, exhibits a preference for eating large worms 
over small worms.  This preference is explained by the fact that natural selection 
favors foraging habits that maximize energy intake; if large worms and small 
worms are both readily available, then a redshank sandpiper’s energy intake is 
maximized when large worms are chosen, since they yield more ingested biomass 
(Goss-Custard, 1977).  Notice, however, that although natural selection is an im-
portant cause of the sandpiper’s evolved preference, selection does not guarantee 
that the preference will evolve.  It is not the sole determiner, but one influence 
among many (Potochnik, 2010a). 
Biology has also been used to motivate mechanistic accounts of explanation 
(Glennan, 1996; Machamer et al., 2000; Bechtel, 2005; 2006; see Laubichler this 
volume; see Bechtel this volume).  Mechanisms are “entities and activities orga-
nized such that they are productive of regular changes from start or set-up to finish 
or termination conditions” (Machamer et al., 2000, p. 3).  Explaining by citing a 
mechanism thus provides both causal and organizational information.  A familiar 
mechanistic explanation in biology can be given for the organic compounds creat-
ed via photosynthesis.  This style of explanation would cite the initial presence of 
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carbon dioxide and sunlight, then detail the successive reactions among the chem-
ical compounds that eventuate in organic compounds and, as a byproduct, oxygen.  
Significant debate surrounds the question of how broadly this conception of ex-
planation should be employed, for instance, whether natural selection should be 
considered a mechanism (Skipper and Millstein, 2005; Barros, 2008). 
Further disagreements regard the proper scope and purpose of biology explana-
tions.  Some argue that many or all biology explanations will soon be replaced by 
explanations that feature molecular biology; this is a form of explanatory reduc-
tionism.  In large part, this argument and its rebuttal have focused on whether ex-
planations that feature molecular genetics will entirely replace classical genetics 
(Waters, 1990). One of the main arguments employed in defense of the explanato-
ry value of classical genetics is that the explanations it provides are general in the 
right way to be maximally explanatory (Kitcher, 1984; Sterelny, 1996).  Sober 
(1999) suggests a middle ground, according to which some explanations benefit 
from generality—they explain by lumping together all similar phenomena—
whereas other explanations are designed to be highly specific—they explain by 
showing what exactly brought about the specific phenomenon, in this particular 
case.   
This distinction between generally applicable explanations and those that track 
the exact process that brought about a particular instance of a phenomenon evokes 
another distinction that has been made in the philosophical literature on explana-
tion.  Some philosophers distinguish how-possibly explanations from how-
actually explanations (Dray, 1957; Brandon, 1990).  As the terminology suggests, 
a how-actually explanation tracks the actual causal process that brought about a 
phenomenon, whereas a how-possibly explanation outlines a process that could 
have (but may not in fact have) brought about a phenomenon.  How-possibly ex-
planation is one way to conceive of the role of explanations that involve claims 
not fully supported by evidence (Forber, 2010).  
To summarize, it seems that some patterns of explanation in biology corrobo-
rate a causal understanding of explanation, while other patterns of explanation 
suggest that mechanisms, where they exist, are explanatory.  Also, though the tra-
ditional philosophical idea that all explanations cite laws of nature is undermined 
by biology, some biology explanations nonetheless corroborate the idea that citing 
general law-like patterns is indeed explanatory.  This is further complicated, how-
ever, to the extent that biology explanations vary in their portrayal of a pattern 
shared by many phenomena versus the specific details of a single phenomenon, 
and relatedly, how closely an explanation is supposed to mirror actual reality.   
This variety suggests that it is not a simple matter to find a single principle un-
derlying all explanations that fall within the purview of biology (let alone all ex-
planations in all of science).  This introduces the question of how to reconcile the 
different points that have been made about biological explanation, if indeed they 
should be reconciled.  There are at least two types of responses one could have to 
this question.  One response is to simply acknowledge that a broad range of ex-
planatory styles is present in biology, and then to focus on accurately characteriz-
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ing that range of styles and the relationships among them. This would be a plural-
ist approach to scientific explanation, for it would not attempt to reconcile diver-
gent points about explanation in biology.  The end result would be a catalogue of 
different approaches to explanation, with the hope that the approaches described 
together capture all of explanatory practice (Brigandt, 2012).   
The habit in philosophy is to consider this sort of pluralism a position of last re-
sort. Simply declaring that there are several approaches without rhyme or reason 
governing the selection among them should be avoided until all avenues of dis-
covering common principles have been exhausted.  The alternative is to try to ac-
commodate the variety of explanatory practices found in biology, features current-
ly captured by different accounts of scientific explanation.  This may create the 
groundwork for a unitary account of biological explanation, in spite of the seem-
ing diversity. 
Indeed, various attempts to reconcile different insights into explanation have 
been made.  The unification account is presented by Kitcher (1981, 1989) as a 
successor view to the D-N account, the basis of which is supposed to be in 
Hempel’s own observations.  Strevens (2004) articulates an account of explana-
tion that assimilates the insights of a causal approach to explanation and a unifica-
tion approach.  In Strevens’ view, an explanation cites causal information at a suf-
ficiently general, yet cohesive, level of description. There is an array of views 
regarding the relationship between mechanistic explanation and causal explana-
tion; Skipper and Millstein (2005) view them as competing options, whereas 
Craver (2007) suggests the mechanistic approach as a way to make sense of the 
explanatory role of causal relationships.   
I will conclude this section with some of my own ideas regarding how to create 
a unitary account of biological explanation.  In my view, a promising start is to 
base a unitary account of biological explanation on the idea that causal infor-
mation is explanatory.  A causal understanding of explanation, in one version or 
another, seems to have gained dominance in philosophy of science, especially in 
philosophy of biology.  Yet research in biology amply demonstrates that most bio-
logical phenomena result from complex causal processes, with many factors com-
bining and interacting at each step in the process.  This renders impractical a sim-
ple causal approach to explanation, whereby to explain you simply cite all the 
causes.  It also creates an opportunity to fill out a broadly causal approach to ex-
planation in a way that accommodates other intuitions about biological explana-
tion.   
I suggest adopting an insight advocated by the unification account, Strevens’ 
(2004, 2009) causal account, and many other philosophical accounts of explana-
tion.  This is the idea that generality benefits an explanation.  Though proper laws 
of nature may be few and far between in biology, depicting causal patterns—that 
is, how certain types of causes tend to bring about certain types of effects, given 
other conditions—is a more modest way to generate explanations that showcase 
lawlike behavior.  This motivates explanations that ignore some details in order to 
depict broad causal patterns (Potochnik, 2011).   
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One example of this feature of explanation is the difference between explana-
tions for short-term and long-term evolutionary change.  An evolutionary model-
ing approach termed optimality or optimization modeling accounts for the preva-
lence of a trait in a population by showing how that trait led to selective advantage 
(in the environment at hand).  Several biologists have shown that this modeling 
approach can be expected to succeed only with long-term evolutionary change, 
that is, over a large number of generations (Hammerstein, 1996; Eshel et al., 
1998), whereas a population genetic approach is required for generational evolu-
tionary change.  One might thus anticipate that, in virtue of the different causal 
patterns involved in short-term and long-term evolution, different explanations are 
warranted.  I explore this difference between optimality explanations and popula-
tion genetic explanations in (Potochnik, 2010a).  
A similar contrast can be drawn between microevolutionary and macroevolu-
tionary explanations.  Microevolution is the evolutionary change within a popula-
tion, whereas macroevolution is the evolution of species (or even larger clades). 
Sterelny (1996) argues that this is another instance where different types of phe-
nomena warrant different types of explanations, explanations that vary as to their 
degree of generality.  In his view, whether macroevolution requires a distinct type 
of explanation comes down to whether it is due to distinct causal influences acting 
on whole species or clades.  This version of explanatory pluralism once again sug-
gests attending to the sort of causal pattern embodied by a phenomenon.      
Yet a complication is introduced by the point I made just above, that many bio-
logical phenomena result from exceedingly complex causal processes.  Consider, 
for example, the causal processes involved in bringing about the long necks of gi-
raffes.  In no particular order, these include, at least, features of ancestral giraffes’ 
environment, including the presence of nutritious leaf matter high up in tall trees; 
various genetic influences on giraffe morphology; developmental processes, in-
cluding additional regulator genes, involved in giraffe neck-development; certain 
genetic mutations arising; competition for resources such that giraffes with a 
greater reach enjoyed increased rates of survival; and changes in developmental 
processes resulting in longer necks.  All of this causal complexity means that dif-
ferent explanations may focus on different causal patterns.  For instance, there 
may be one explanation of giraffe neck development and a different explanation of 
selection for lengthened giraffe necks.  What causal pattern is explanatory, and 
thus what parts of the causal process should be mentioned, depends on what one 
might generally call the context of explanation.  This is determined by the goals of 
the research program for which the explanation is generated.  Recall from above 
the debate over reductionism, including whether biological explanations will ulti-
mately all feature molecular biology.  The current view is antireductionist, for it 
suggests that multiple, different explanations will continue to be valuable, insofar 
as each captures a different causal pattern (Potochnik, 2010b).   
To summarize, my attempt to integrate different insights into explanation re-
sults in the view that biological explanations (1) give causal information, (2) in a 
way that depicts a broad causal pattern that is (3) explanatory given the particular 
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research goals at hand.  I more fully articulate and defend this view in (Potochnik, 
unpublished).  This approach accommodates much of the diversity of views about 
biology explanations surveyed in this section, but it unites them into a single view.  
It also disputes or neglects some claims, such as the idea that some explanations 
benefit by maximizing their specificity (Sober, 1999), or the idea that explanations 
generally depict mechanisms.  Finally, I must emphasize that my suggested ac-
count of explanation is of course one view among many, and the debate surround-
ing different philosophical views of scientific explanation, and explanation in bi-
ology, will not end anytime soon.   
3 Explanation and Scientific Practice 
In the previous section, we surveyed the range of styles of explanation found in 
biology and considered a few approaches to making sense of that diversity.  Let us 
now set aside questions surrounding how biological explanations are formulated 
and focus instead on how the aims of explanation influence other features of sci-
entific practice in biology.  This will demonstrate how an accurate understanding 
of explanatory practice in biology contributes to an understanding of other charac-
teristics of the field.  In this section I will focus primarily on evolutionary biology, 
but I will also indicate points of contact and resonances with other areas of biolo-
gy.   
In contemporary evolutionary biology, genes are important.  From the discov-
ery of DNA, to the Human Genome Project, and most recently the Thousand Ge-
nome project, genetics—and especially molecular genetics—has received much 
attention both in biology and society at large.  And genes are, of course, absolutely 
central to the evolutionary process.  Though epigenetic inheritance is well docu-
mented (see Uller this volume), genetic inheritance remains central to most evolu-
tionary processes (see Avise this volume).   
In spite of all of this, many well-regarded models of evolutionary change ig-
nore genes entirely.  A prime example of this is evolutionary game theory.  This 
modeling approach is applicable to the long-term evolution of traits with frequen-
cy-dependent fitness, i.e., when the fitness of a phenotypic trait depends upon the 
traits of others in the population.2 Different phenotypes are represented as differ-
ent strategies to playing a game, and their fitness is represented as the “payoffs” of 
those strategies.  Evolutionary game theory is used to calculate the equilibrium 
point for distribution of phenotypes that would result if natural selection acted un-
impeded on the population; there may be one such equilibrium, multiple, or none.  
For example, the vampire bat’s behavioral trait of sharing hunting spoils with oth-
                                                            
2 A trait’s fitness is a measure of the trait’s relative contribution to organisms’ ability to sur-
vive and reproduce.  However, the concept of fitness is vexed; see Rosenberg and Bouchard 
(2010) for an overview of the difficulties.   
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er vampire bats is conceived of as a strategy, as is the behavior of not sharing.  
The first trait has a higher payoff—a greater fitness value—when other bats share 
food in return.  Thus one observes reciprocal altruism in the form of food-sharing 
among vampire bats (Wilkinson, 1984).  
Most evolutionary game theory models entirely ignore genetic inheritance.  
Some explicitly incorporate population genetics, featuring one- or at most two-
locus inheritance, but this is uncommon, and even then the genetic dynamics are 
simplified to the point of unreality.  This situation is puzzling: genes are acknowl-
edged by all to be crucial causal influences on evolution, and yet they are ignored 
in many approaches to modeling evolution, with evolutionary game theory as a 
prime example.  
This neglect of important influences is a feature of modeling approaches 
throughout biology.  Population genetics and quantitative genetics both ignore the 
niceties of complex genetic influences on phenotypic traits, as well as ignoring the 
environmental sources of fitness upon which game theory focuses.  Cutting-edge 
genetic research sets aside a host of non-genetic factors.  For example, Amos et al. 
(2010) focus on the genetic influences on human smoking behavior, mentioning 
that of course there are many other causal influences on an individual’s decision 
for or against smoking cigarettes. Models of development tend to ignore entirely 
evolutionary influences on traits. In recognition of this, Mayr (1961) distinguished 
between proximate (developmental) and ultimate (evolutionary) causes.3   
This practice of continued neglect of central causal factors would be mysterious 
without attending to explanatory aims.  Recall that in the previous section, I en-
couraged thinking of explanations as portraying causal patterns, and I pointed out 
that complex causal processes necessitate a choice of which causal pattern an ex-
planation should feature.  This offers a way to make sense of modeling approaches 
in biology continuing to neglect many causal influences, some of which are actu-
ally crucial to bringing about the phenomenon to be explained.  A primary use of 
models in biology is to provide explanations.  Causal factors, including some cen-
tral ones, are neglected when those factors are not part of an explanation’s focal 
causal pattern.   
Neglecting causal factors makes a model more general in the following sense.  
A causal factor would be represented in a model by including an additional varia-
ble or parameter.  By omitting that variable or parameter, the model simply says 
less about the world; it remains mute about that factor, including even whether it 
is a factor. Put another way, the model abstracts away from any causal factor it 
                                                            
3 Mayr’s distinction between proximate and ultimate causes can be construed as a distinction 
between explanations of why members of a population have some trait (evolutionary/ultimate 
causes) and explanations of how members of the population came to have that trait (proxi-
mate/developmental causes).  This proximate/ultimate distinction has received a good amount of 
attention in philosophy of biology.  Ariew (2003) reinterprets the distinction as distinguishing 
between dynamical versus statistical explanations.  Laland et al. (2011) argue that Mayr’s dis-
tinction fails because the types of causes distinguished are interrelated.    
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neglects; it does not represent anything with regard to the factor—not its presence, 
its value, nor its absence.  For example, a population genetic model that does not 
employ a parameter for effective population size (Ne) is mute on whether and to 
what degree drift is a significant causal factor.  This results in a model that is more 
abstract than if the neglected causal factor had been represented, and also more 
general, for the model applies to systems that vary with respect to the neglected 
causal factor.  Continuing the example above, a population genetic model that 
does not represent drift is more abstract because of that omission.  It is also more 
general, for it applies to genetic change in populations where the significance of 
drift varies.  (Notice, however, that the fidelity of a model that omits Ne will be 
lower than that of a model that employs Ne whenever drift is a significant influ-
ence.)   
Models of a phenomenon that represent just one applicable causal pattern and 
neglect other causal influences are sometimes simplified to the point of unreality.  
That is, sometimes a dummy variable or parameter is included in a model that no 
one expects to accurately represent the world.  This is the strategic use of idealiza-
tions to ignore causal influences.  For instance, population genetic models often 
assume that a population of organisms is infinite in size.  This assumption allows 
the influence of genetic drift to be ignored.  Similarly, evolutionary game theory 
models often simply assume that offspring resemble parents—that like begets 
like—thereby ignoring the complexities of systems of genetic inheritance.  This is, 
then, an additional feature of biology that explanatory practice helps to make 
sense of.  The aims of explanation account not only for the continued use of sim-
plified, partial models, but even models that are unrealistic in many respects. 
A variety of philosophers and biologists have appealed to the aims of explana-
tions in order to account for the continued use of abstractions and idealizations in 
models.  Levins (1966) introduced the idea that there are competing aims for mod-
els—accuracy, precision, and generality—and that some precision and accuracy 
may be traded off for a compensatory gain in generality.  Weisberg (2006) argues 
that such a tradeoff is justified by the aim of using models to give explanations.  
Godfrey-Smith (2006) dubs the resulting way of doing science “model-based sci-
ence”. Finally, Wimsatt (1987) discusses the role of idealizations in particular (see 
Pennock this volume for considerations related to model-based reasoning).   
Notice that, although generating explanations motivates the continuing im-
portance of abstract and idealized models, this does not guarantee that all of biolo-
gy functions this way.  Though some precision and accuracy may be sacrificed to 
the end of building a general model, there may be situations where other tradeoffs 
are warranted.  For instance, some explanations integrate more causal factors than 
others; an example is models that integrate both game theory and population ge-
netics.  Additionally, some models are used for purposes other than generating ex-
planations of real-world phenomena; this is true of many models in theoretical 
population genetics.  Finally, mathematical modeling may not be central to all 
fields of biology, for example, to physiology.   
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Setting aside the features of models, another feature of biological practice that 
explanatory practice helps account for is many biologists’ total commitment to 
one or another methodological approach, and the intense disagreements that result.  
Proponents or critics of particular approaches are prone to making sweeping, ideo-
logically loaded claims.  Evolutionary game theory is a prime example here as 
well.  The use of game theory in biology has been described as a “leap of faith” 
(Grafen, 1984) and a “worldview”(Brown, 2001) by its proponents, and criticized 
for the same reason by its detractors.  Roughgarden (2009) criticizes sexual selec-
tion theory on the grounds that it is wrong about what is “basic to biological na-
ture”.  Many similar sweeping claims can be found in other areas of biology.   
That differences in approach are frequently construed as a matter of fundamen-
tally opposed ideologies suggests that different research programs are incompati-
ble, insofar as they are committed to different views of biological reality.  But in 
my view, such debates are better understood as arising not from different theoreti-
cal commitments at all, but commitments to different explanatory projects. As we 
have discussed here, models employ abstractions and idealizations in order to fo-
cus on targeted features of a phenomenon, at the expense of ignoring or misrepre-
senting other features.  Different modeling approaches thus can seem to be incom-
patible, for they employ different parameters/variables and opposed assumptions. 
However, the exact opposite is true. The limitations of such models make the use 
of multiple approaches essential. Thus, despite the ideologically laden rhetoric bi-
ologists often employ, the question to ask about apparently competing modeling 
approaches is not which grounds a more successful worldview, but which method 
better serves one's present research aims.  And research aims are in large part de-
termined by explanatory goals, that is, by what phenomena and causal patterns 
that influence them are of primary interest (Brigandt, forthcoming).  To return to 
one of the examples above, evolutionary game theorists focus on the role of natu-
ral selection in evolution and set aside non-selective influences, either by ignoring 
them entirely or by accommodating their influence in model parameters.  This 
need not be the result of a worldview—at this point, biologists agree that non-
selective influences can crucially shape the evolutionary process.  The use of evo-
lutionary game theory is instead best defended on the basis of the aim of explain-
ing selection’s influence on evolutionary phenomena.   
Though I have argued that ideological positions are not often warranted in bi-
ology, I also suspect that the tendency of biologists to adopt such ideological posi-
tions indicates something important about biological phenomena.  Let us ask: what 
enables simple differences of explanatory focus to be interpreted as wholly differ-
ent worldviews?  That there are such entrenched proponents and opponents to dif-
ferent approaches indicates that a variety of approaches have some purchase on 
the evolutionary process. In my view, this reflects the complex causal processes at 
work in biological phenomena, and the endless variety in how causal factors com-
bine and interact.  This further corroborates the suggestion made in Section 2 that 
a philosophical account of biological explanation must accommodate variety in 
explanations that arise from focusing on different causal patterns.   
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Put most broadly, explanatory aims account for the continued diversity of ap-
proaches in biology, as well as biologists’ tendencies to adopt one or a few ap-
proaches as their guiding principle/worldview/etc. Explanatory aims also account 
for why grappling with exceedingly complex causal processes often does not mo-
tivate increasingly complex models.  Explanations focus on just one among many 
causal patterns that govern a phenomenon, and this is accomplished by models 
that abstract and idealize away from other causal factors in order to represent the 
focal causal pattern.  Sometimes the resulting model is simplified to the point of 
unreality, yet it can still do its job of representing a causal pattern important to the 
occurrence of the phenomenon to be explained.   
4 Conclusion: Teaching about Biological Explanation 
So far in this chapter, we have considered what philosophical accounts of scien-
tific explanation can tell us about biology explanation, and how explanatory prac-
tice in biology has influenced—and should influence—general accounts of expla-
nation.  We have also explored some features of the field of biology that only 
make sense in light of the aim of generating explanations and particular explanato-
ry strategies.  By means of all of this, I hope to have demonstrated that approaches 
to biological explanation and how they influence scientific practice are important 
to biology education. In this section I will develop five suggestions for particular 
ways in which biology education should attend to issues related to scientific ex-
planation.  Along the way I will suggest a few advantages that stand to be gained 
from implementing these suggestions. 
 
4.1 Suggestion 1: Do not overly emphasize laws when thinking 
about biology explanations 
It is to be expected that discussions in biology will include reference to “laws.”  
Calling something a law is a way to express the idea that certain phenomena pro-
ceed according to a more-or-less lawlike pattern. For instance, Mendel’s Laws 
capture some regularities pertaining to genetic transmission.  Such references to 
laws may, for the most part, reasonably set aside the question raised in Section 2 
regarding whether and to what degree there are laws of biology.  In discussions 
focused on biological phenomena and not intended to describe the field of biolo-
gy, the term “law” can simply be used loosely.  Hence we continue to refer to 
Mendel’s Laws, even though there are clear exceptions to these laws—exceptions 
that generate their own distinct lawlike patterns.   
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What should be avoided is taking too seriously references to biological laws.  
From the fact that there are references to laws within biology, it should not be in-
ferred that the field of biology progresses via the discovery of new laws (see 
Lange this volume for an examination of what would be required for there to be 
biological laws.)  Similarly, it should not be inferred that finding a law is needed 
in order to explain a phenomenon.  It has been thoroughly demonstrated in this 
chapter that many explanatory projects in biology do not rely on laws.  This means 
that, in biology education, accepted explanations should not be portrayed as citing 
laws, especially when such a portrayal is somewhat forced.  Encountering a range 
of biological explanations that resist simplification to laws will help prepare stu-
dents for the vast range of work in biology to which laws are minimally relevant 
or not relevant at all.   
 
4.2 Suggestion 2: Explicitly motivate forms of explanation that are 
common in biology 
Following on the heels of the first suggestion, the idea here is that biology educa-
tion is enriched by explicitly attending to features of biological explanations that 
may seem strange to outsiders, but are in fact quite common explanatory strategies 
in biology.  This involves more than discussing particular explanations, and resist-
ing the temptation to construe them as based on laws.  The suggestion additionally 
involves inviting students to think—critically but openly—about how various ex-
planations succeed.  I will provide three brief illustrations here, though there are 
almost certainly additional forms of explanation across biology that deserve such 
focus.   
Recall from above that traditional optimality explanations account for the prev-
alence of a trait in a population by showing how that trait led to selective ad-
vantage (in the environment at hand).  Optimality explanations may be understood 
as a type of functional explanation: the presence of a trait is explained according 
to the role it plays for an organism.  In evolutionary contexts, this style of explana-
tion is made possible by the assumption that natural selection promotes traits that 
increase fitness.  Thus the fitness-conferring role of a trait is a causal influence on 
the trait’s propagation.  This is a helpful lens through which to view optimality 
explanations, for it at once showcases what is fitting about this style of explana-
tion, and also its limitations, or what may be problematic.   
Evolutionary game theory models provide an explanatory strategy closely re-
lated to that of optimality models.  However, the emphasis is shifted from the se-
lective advantage of a trait to points of stability in the shifting proportions of a 
range of trait values.  One prominent approach to evolutionary game theory is 
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fruitfully considered as a type of equilibrium explanation.4  Equilibrium explana-
tions are, in my view, a type of broadly causal explanations, for they capture some 
features of causal patterns (cf. Kuorikoski, 2007).  Yet equilibrium explanations 
differ from traditional causal explanations, for they entirely omit any information 
about the causal process that led to the equilibrium point.   
Another, very different type of explanation is mechanistic explanation, viz., 
explaining a phenomenon as the result of a structured series of causal steps. An 
example is the molecular explanation of photosynthesis, which traces the series of 
chemical transformations among macromolecules by which carbon dioxide and 
sunlight are converted into sugars and other organic compounds.  In some regards, 
this form of explanation is the complete opposite of functional and equilibrium 
forms of explanation.  Whereas equilibrium and functional explanations cite end-
points and neglect processes, mechanistic explanations instead detail the exact 
steps by which a phenomenon proceeds.   
There are, of course, many unresolved questions about the relationship among 
these forms of explanation and the relative value of each.  Some considerations 
were introduced in Section 2, including one possible way to assimilate all forms of 
biological explanation.  Regardless of the theoretical questions about their rela-
tionship, though, each form of explanation deserves explicit attention in biology 
education.  Implementing this suggestion will facilitate a broad education in the 
range of explanatory projects in biology.  It will also help spur students to explicit-
ly consider what form of explanation is generated—or attempted—in different and 
novel research programs.  This is facilitated by introducing forms of explanation 
as tentative, susceptible to reinterpretation or the revision of methodology (see the 
next suggestion for more on this idea).   
 
4.3 Suggestion 3: Resist the temptation to simplify the diversity of 
approaches in biology and their apparent incompatibility 
This chapter has only surveyed a small part of the astounding variety of explanato-
ry projects in biology. This variety of explanatory projects is not surprising, given 
the vast array of types of phenomena under investigation in different subfields of 
biology.  Some considerations from Section 2, and subsequently suggestion 2 
above, suggest that there may even be different strategies of explanations in biol-
ogy, viz., explanations with wholly different aims and attributes. 
One might be tempted to simplify this picture in the classroom.  Introducing a 
large variety of explanatory projects can undermine generalizations that can be es-
                                                            
4 This approach analyzes games for points of stability, e.g., evolutionary stable strategies 
(Maynard Smith and Price, 1973).  A different approach to evolutionary game theory instead 
specifies population dynamics, e.g., replicator dynamics, and thus results in dynamical models.   
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pecially useful as heuristics for students.  It also takes up additional class time that 
could be used in other valuable ways.  Yet ignoring—or not focusing upon—the 
immense variety of explanatory projects and explanatory strategies in biology 
trains students to expect the field of biology to proceed in lockstep, and may result 
in later suspicion regarding unfamiliar projects or opposed methodology.  Expo-
sure to variety should have the opposite effect.  This instead facilitates a more nu-
anced appreciation for the vast range of causal influences and interactions within 
the purview of biology, and the diverse routes to understanding found throughout 
the field.  For example, recall from above Mayr’s distinction between proximate 
(developmental) and ultimate (evolutionary) explanations.  Kampourakis and 
Zogza (2009) employed that distinction to help students clarify for themselves the 
elements of evolutionary explanations.  In this case, emphasizing the distinction 
between why members of a population have some trait and how they came to have 
the trait leads students to the recognition that evolutionary explanations and de-
velopmental explanations contain distinct elements, that they play distinct roles—
that is, that one does not preclude the other, and that there are patterns in what sort 
of causal information is provided by each.  Notice that this educational role can be 
played by Mayr’s distinction in spite of criticisms of that distinction, viz., regard-
less of whether the types of causes in question are in fact often interrelated or the 
precise construal of the type of explanatory difference.   
Teaching the diversity of explanatory projects and strategies and how those 
have changed over time should also engender in students an expectation that ac-
cepted explanatory strategies change alongside accepted knowledge in the field.  
For instance, optimal foraging theory was initially met with suspicion, for it was 
thought that this required too much psychological sophistication of cognitively 
simple animals.  Since, it has been clarified that optimal foraging explanations are 
evolutionary explanations, with no assumptions made about the means by which 
organisms’ foraging behavior develops.  Such shifts in accepted explanatory strat-
egies are a central example of how methodological norms, and not just stores of 
knowledge, progress in biology.  As such, it helps prepare students to think explic-
itly and critically about methodology, and to see explanatory practice as a central 
component of the field of biology.   
 
4.4 Suggestion 4: Explicitly consider the role of models—partial, 
unrealistic representation 
Another move that facilitates the explicit and critical analysis of methodology is a 
teaching focus on the role of models in biology and how that role varies among 
subfields and research programs.  I suggested above that there is no reason to as-
sume that laws are central to biology.  In contrast to the circumstances regarding 
laws, it is clear that constructing models—whether mathematical, physical, or 
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computer—is an important component of many projects in biology.  Evolutionary 
game theory and population genetic models, predator-prey models, species abun-
dance models, model organisms, agent-based models… the list could go on much 
longer.   
Explicitly addressing the role of models in biology should involve, at least, 
considering the purposes to which models are put, and how those purposes and the 
features of models vary among different subfields and research programs.  There 
may or may not be much found to be common among mathematical models, phys-
ical models, and computer simulations. Another prime emphasis should be the 
mechanics of abstraction and idealization, and the purposes to which these are put.  
As we saw in Section 3, the continued importance of simplified models of com-
plex phenomena is due, at least in part, to aims of biological explanations.  An in-
vestigation of the prominent methodological role of models will thus both necessi-
tate and further investigations of the role of explanation in biology.  
 
4.5 Suggestion 5: Emphasize methodological differences over 
seemingly ideological differences; teach that a plurality of 
approaches is here to stay 
This suggestion takes off from the considerations introduced toward the end of 
Section 3.  There I argued that a range of issues on which biologists have taken 
ideological positions—declaring that a research program is the basis of a success-
ful “worldview,” or should be taken on faith (or avoided for that reason), etc.—are 
more profitably considered to be methodological differences.  Commitments to 
different explanatory projects can lead to the endorsement of different background 
assumptions, abstractions, and idealizations, and hence differing views about the 
well-foundedness of various modeling approaches.  For instance, advocates of 
evolutionary developmental biology (or “evo-devo”), the subfield of biology de-
voted to the evolution of developmental processes, view the field as a corrective to 
traditional evolutionary biology.  Yet some statements of evo-devo’s role go too 
far in the opposite direction.  According to Müller (2007), the “explanatory 
weight” belongs to development, not evolution, for evolving developmental sys-
tems are “the causal basis for phenotypic form” (emphasis added).   Evo-devo 
draws attention to one set of causal influences, and how they interact with selec-
tion. This likely is an important, even crucial, part of the evolutionary story, but it 
does not undermine the importance of evolution.  Emphasis in biology education 
on how methodological differences arise in the field of biology would help the 
next generation of biologists avoid such arguments over the primacy of one or an-
other approach, refocusing attention on careful development and critique of meth-
odology, etc.   
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The suggestion to emphasize methodological differences instead of ideological 
positions is an outgrowth of the first four suggestions made here.  Those sugges-
tions began with the idea that a monolithic picture of law-based explanation 
should be avoided (Suggestion 1), substituting in its place a critical analysis of the 
range of common forms of explanation in biology (Suggestion 2).  That analysis 
should resist the temptation to simplify the diversity of approaches to explanations 
or to minimize differences or seeming incompatibilities (Suggestion 3).  Careful 
attention to the features of biological explanations benefits from and reinforces 
consideration of the role of models in biology and their relationship to explana-
tions (Suggestion 4).  All of this arms the student of biology to interpret debates 
among biologists with an eye to the diversity of projects, and the diversity of 
methods they motivate (Suggestion 5).  A consequence of implementing these 
components in biology education is the lesson that a plurality of methods in biolo-
gy is here to stay.  
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